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Abstract. How special (or not) is the epoch we are living in? What is the appropriate
reference class for embedding the observations made at the present time? How probable
– or else – is anything we observe in the fulness of time? Contemporary cosmology and
astrobiology bring those seemingly old-fashioned philosophical issues back into focus.
There are several examples of contemporary research which use the assumption of
typicality in time (or temporal Copernicanism) explicitly or implicitly, while not truly
elaborating upon the meaning of this assumption. The present paper brings attention
to the underlying and often uncritically accepted assumptions in these cases. It also
aims to defend a more radical position that typicality in time is not – and cannot ever
be – well-defined, in contrast to the typicality in space, and the typicality in various
specific parameter spaces. This, of course, does not mean that we are atypical in time;
instead, the notion of typicality in time is necessarily somewhat vague and restricted.
In principle, it could be strengthened by further defining the relevant context, e.g., by
referring to typicality within the Solar lifetime, or some similar restricting clause.
Keywords: cosmology: theory – extragalactic astronomy – astrobiology – futures
studies – history and philosophy of astronomy – Copernicanism – anthropic principle –
extraterrestrial intelligence
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2I think we agree, the past is over.
— George W. Bush (as reported by Dallas Morning News, May 10, 2000.)
1. Introduction
The classical cosmological principle (henceforth CP) of Eddington and Milne enables
us to make the notion of typicality in space intelligible – at least on large, cosmological
scale within the context of the Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker family of models
(henceforth FLRW). We may state that we are typical in space in virtue of accepting
homogeneity and isotropy of the universe on large scales: each place is as good as any
other. Of course, it is important to be careful about the meaning of “place” here, since
the crucial step is to smooth out local features which would obviously make us atypical
(we live on a planet, in a higher than average density region, with certain chemical
abundances, etc.). Once we keep tabs on this, it makes sense to define an averaged,
smoothed-out reference to which we can compare any spatial location. For quantities
which depend on the choice of a proper system of reference in space, we may always
switch to the system of reference associated with the cosmic microwave background
(henceforth CMB). This has been excellently confirmed by the measurement of the
proper motion of the Local Group of galaxies by observing the dipole anisotropy in
CMB (e.g., Smoot, Gorenstein, and Muller 1977; Gorenstein and Smoot 1981). We can
talk freely about the spatial typicality of any quantity or feature of the universe, since
we have a well-defined average, offered in each hypersurface of constant cosmic time
by the cosmological principle. For instance, we can meaningfully ask questions such
as: Is the gaseous fraction of the baryonic mass of the Milky Way typical for all spiral
galaxies? Is it typical that planets like Earth form near the co-rotation radius in spiral
galaxies? Is the amount of chemical element X we perceive on Earth or in our Galactic
vicinity somehow special or typical? Etc.
It is important to understand as precisely as possible what we are doing when posing
and addressing such questions. We have a sample of natural phenomena, established by
various empirical methods, which span a range in various parameter spaces, including
4-D spacetime. For example, galaxies form catalogues extended in space (and look-
back time), but can also be represented as points in spaces of redshift or mass or
morphological parameters, etc. Some of these measures are continuous, other discrete,
but all are supposedly well-defined across the entire sample. There is an underlying
(“natural”) distribution of these parameters; for example, CP indicates that the spatial
distribution of galaxies or groups and clusters of galaxies is uniform on large scales, while
in contrast morphological parameters are strongly concentrated toward those describing
two main galaxy types. Underlying distributions are usually thought of as consequences
of various cosmological and cosmogonical processes, but as we shall see below, this might
be misleading when distributions in time are concerned.
For spatial averages, CP serve us very well (this is not to say CP is entirely
unproblematic: see, for instance, Beisbart (2009) for a cogent philosophical criticism).
3Sufficiently large spatial volumes of the universe, with local fluctuations smoothed out,
will be representative for the whole. If we claim, for instance, that the Sun is a typical
star within a set of the Main Sequence stars in our Galaxy, there are well-defined criteria
on the basis of which one could evaluate the claim (Gustafsson 1998; Robles et al. 2008);
similarly for our Galaxy within a set of galaxies in a representative spatial volume of
the universe (Hammer et al. 2007). Clearly, these issues are of key importance for
astrobiology and our investigations of habitability of the universe (e.g., Chyba and Hand
2005; Gonzalez 2005). Copernicanism still serves as a powerful principle in astrobiology
and many conclusions, such as those about the Galactic Habitable Zone, are impossible
to reach without some Copernican assumption about the typicality.
Now, we eminently do not have such a grounding principle for typicality in time, in
spite of the relativistic embedding of time into cosmological spacetime and the key role of
time in cosmology (e.g., Balbi 2013). With the demise of the classical steady state theory,
in particular the version of Bondi and Gold (1948) based on the perfect cosmological
principle (henceforth PCP), it has become clear that such a grounding principle is not
only unavailable, but would contradict the very central notion of the evolving universe
(Balashov 1994). PCP postulated homogeneity in both space and time, thus being
a special case of CP with the highest level of symmetry. Obviously, PCP extremely
constrained cosmological models, which has been regarded as a virtue of the steady-state
theory in its heyday: there was just a single steady-state theory, compared with many
possible Big Bang models (Bondi 1961). Averaging any cosmological – or indeed any
physical – quantities whatsoever with PCP is trivial: after allowing for local fluctuations,
the average value is always equal to the currently observed one. This cannot hold in
the evolving cosmologies, however, with mere spatial CP. There has been an interesting
twist here in the context of the last two decades and the development of inflationary
cosmology: generic forms of chaotic inflation tend to produce the inflationary multiverse,
which might realize PCP (e.g., Linde, Linde, and Mezhlumian 1994). The measurement
problem in this case is also quite complex and not well understood.
Can time be regarded independently of the reference class of objects? For starters,
some entities might not be persistent. E.g., galaxies or stars may cease to exist at
some point in the future. Physical eschatology suggests that even in formally infinite
future of open or flat models, all bound structures, from nucleons to galaxies, including
even black holes, have their expiration date (Adams and Laughlin 1997). Galaxies,
for instance, will lose all stars through either slingshot evaporation or collapse to the
central supermassive black hole at the epoch about 1019 years after the Big Bang – a
huge timescale for sure, but equally negligible from the point of view of future temporal
infinity as the present age of the universe. Therefore, averaging over the entire temporal
interval [0,+∞) might be problematic, since after some critical epoch we lack the entities
in question.
The second problem is that even entirely natural processes might fluctuate on
sufficiently large timescales. Consider a well-defined property of the observed universe,
for example the baryonic mass fraction of gas in an L∗ galaxy like the Milky Way, fg.
4This goes from 1 in the distant past, before any star formation took place when all
baryons were in the gas form, to some value near 0 in the course of future cosmological
evolution. Note that it will not formally go to exactly 0 at any given final moment
in the future, until other destructive processes, like the proton decay are taken into
account on much longer timescales of 1034 years or more. Suppose that we even restrict
the temporal interval to [0, tevap], taking into account the evaporation of stars from
galaxies as per results of Adams and Laughlin. What is its mean value, however? We
can build models of the rate of gas consumption and its future evolution, but there
are multiple unavoidable uncertainties related to such enterprise: of the model, of the
underlying theory, of boundary conditions, etc. In particular, it is obvious that gas
consumption through star formation will cease at some future epoch (see Section 2
below), but complex feedbacks prevent us from ascertaining when. In addition, new
long-term effects which are neglected today will become relevant in the eschatological
future – even after the cessation of conventional star formation, a slow process like
accretion of interstellar gas by brown dwarfs will continue and might result in further
reduction of fg (C´irkovic´ 2005). These complications have not been analysed so far in
any kind of detail, due to rather poor theoretical understanding of physical eschatology.
Finally, a potentially huge problem to be encountered in future epochs, in contrast
to past epochs, are intentional influences. While living beings have influenced their
physical environment in the past as well (e.g., in the Great Oxygenation Event about
2.45 Gyr ago; Holland 2006), this pales in comparison to what we could expect in the
future, especially in connection with the advanced technological civilizations described
by Kardashev’s classification (Kardashev 1964, 1985; C´irkovic´ 2015). Even in the
particular case of very immature human civilization, introduction of the concept of the
anthropocene testifies that the intentional influence of technology on our surroundings
has become the legitimate topic of discourse in many disciplines (Ruddiman 2013).
Extrapolations of these trends onto the timescales of physical eschatology introduces
a completely new type of uncertainty with potential to dominate the future values of
parameters we wish to average over.
So, there are multiple problems with trying to average over the cosmological
timescale. In spite of all these difficulties, why is the question of temporal typicality
interesting and important? There are several interesting arguments advanced in
cosmology, future studies, philosophy, and astrobiology which rely on the “Copernican”
assumption of temporal typicality. The prototype is the “Doomsday Argument” in the
version of Gott (1993), which follows from the affirmative answer to the question: can we
predict the duration of X from X’s present age? A particularly interesting example is the
recent study of Olson (2017), which advances the argument that a more dangerous early
universe increases the number of habitable sites at the universe today. Among the several
assumptions used in the argument, the crucial one is of temporal Copernicanism, i.e.,
that our particular cosmic time is close to typical. (Note that temporal Copernicanism is
diametrically opposed to chronocentrism, as formulated e.g., by Fowles 1974 as the belief
“that one’s own times are paramount”. The undermining of temporal Copernicanism
5does not mean any endorsement of chronocentrism, especially not as this is misused in
social and political context; we shall return to this point in the concluding section.)
If the temporal Copernicanism is undermined, so are arguments such as Olson’s. One
can go even further and argue that tacit temporal Copernicanism is often responsible
for misunderstanding of much of the physical eschatology: we look in hindsight at the
evolutionary processes leading to the present moment and privilege them in the entire
set of all evolutionary processes occurring at all timescales. While a sceptic can argue
that this form of bias is impossible to avoid for temporal observers such as ourselves,
this sceptical reasoning does not necessarily end the discussion; we can establish fairly
precise theoretical predictions for processes which have not and indeed could not be
empirically established so far, such as the Hawking evaporation of black holes, natural
formation of positronium, etc. In itself, this temporal bias does not force us to accept
temporal Copernicanism, just as the empirical fact that we have evolved in a galaxy
does not force us to assume anything particular about our spatial location within it.
Quite to the contrary, our astrobiological research have led us to the concept of the
Galactic Habitable Zone, thus refuting the naive Copernican view that our position in
the Milky Way is random, unconstrained, or indeed typical (e.g., Gonzalez 2005).
Therefore, in the rest of this paper, we wish to defend a deflationary thesis that we
cannot entertain typicality in time and use it in anthropic (or other) arguments. This,
obviously, does not preclude using other kinds of anthropic arguments; if anything, it
supports anthropic reasoning by delineating its limits and helping focus on important
open questions. The present considerations apply only to the classical cosmological
discourse; averaging in quantum cosmology is an entirely different and complex issue.
In Section 2, we discuss technical aspects of temporal averaging and difficulties one
encounters in trying to establish temporal typicality. In Section 3, the deflationary view
of temporal Copernicanism is elaborated, before recapitulation and discussing some
prospects for further work in the concluding Section.
2. Temporal typicality?
What does it mean for a quantity, say A, which we measure or theoretically consider
here, on Earth, to be typical in space? Clearly, one natural way is to claim that its local
value A(x0) is not very different from the spatial average (mean value):
|A( ~x0)− A¯| < , (1)
where ~x0 is our spatial location in a well-defined coordinate system and  is a small
positive real number. The mean value is obtained by averaging over the relevant volume:
A¯ = lim
V→Vmax
1
V
∫
V
A(~x)d3~x, (2)
where V is the relevant volume limited by:
Vmax =
{
∞, open and flat Friedmann models
Vtot, closed Friedmann models
(3)
6which subsumes CP in the very definition of the Friedmann models. The limiting
process in (2) is uncontroversial as long as A(x) is well-behaved, which is the case
for all astrophysical quantities of interest. Alternatively, one could use the median of
the distribution of A. For continuous data, the median value A(m) is the value of the
function for argument m such that the area (or integral) of the data to one side of the
point is equal to the area on the other side:∫ λmax
m
A(λ)dλ∫ λmax
λmin
A(λ)dλ
=
1
2
. (4)
Astrophysical quantities dependent on cosmic time, like the CMB temperature or the
star-formation density in a particular galaxy or a type of galaxies, which can adequately
be represented by continuous real functions, can play the role of A here. In each case,
however, there is a host of requirements which need to be satisfied in order for the
mathematical machinery to work. Even the more general Lebesgue-Stieltjes integration
is not necessarily well-defined in the integrals here (e.g., Shilov and Gurevich 1978). The
reason for this is, obviously, the fact that CP is valid only on large scales, strictly in
the lengthscale λ→∞ limit‡, and in the real universe we have all sorts of structures to
deal with. Local structures cause deviations from the FLRW metric which often cannot
be treated as small perturbations to the “regular” FLRW background.
Therefore, it has been acknowledged recently that even the spatial averaging is far
from being trivial. Many new studies testify on the increased interest in this issue (e.g.,
Coley 2010; Ellis 2011; Clarkson et al. 2011; Kasˇpar and Sv´ıtek 2014). In a prestigious
review (Clarkson et al. 2011, p. 2):
The Universe may well be statistically homogeneous and isotropic above a
certain scale, but on smaller scales it is highly inhomogeneous, quite unlike
an FLRW Universe. General relativity is a theory in which spacetime itself
is the dynamical field with no external reference space. Yet it is ubiquitous in
cosmology to talk of a ‘background’ which is exactly homogeneous and isotropic,
on which galaxies and structure exist as perturbations. Is this the same as
starting with a more detailed truly inhomogeneous metric of spacetime, and
progressively smoothing it – probably by a non-covariant process – until we get
to this background?
This problem gave rise, in the last decade, to a debate around the importance of
back-reactions, i.e. the effect of inhomogeneities on the average evolution of the universe.
In essence, doubts have been raised with regard to the standard calculations of the
non linear growth of density perturbations, which is usually treated with a Newtonian
‡ Strictly speaking, the validity of the CP is only testable within the causal horizon, and there may
very well be large deviations from the FLRW metric beyond the Hubble volume. This, however, has
no practical consequence for this argument.
7approximation decoupled from the average background expansion of a uniform universe.
If true, this objection would put into question the interpretation of several cosmological
observations, including the accelerated expansion and its dominant interpretation in
terms of a dark energy component. As of now, the debate is not settled (see, e.g. Green
and Wald 2014 and Bucher et al. 2015 for two opposing takes on the subject). We note
that the problem of spatial averages cannot be entirely disentangled from the question of
time in cosmology, since there have been proposals that the operation of synchronizing
clocks and defining cosmic time is ill-defined in an inhomogeneous universe (Wiltshire
2009).
Also (Clarkson et al. 2011, p. 5):
Averaging is in some respects a fitting process, but does not necessarily
correspond to any actual observational procedure. Can one propose an average
model of the Universe based on the past-null cone? [...] it does not make
sense to simply average today’s state of the Universe with what it was like in
the past. One would expect any averaging operation to leave the background
invariant, and it is not obvious that this can happen for FLRW somehow
averaged on its light cones. So averaging based on observations would need to
involve comparing the Universe today with earlier times by the use of dynamical
equations relating variables at these different times: a very model dependent
procedure, and not ‘averaging’ in a normal sense.
The last conclusion is very important from the point of view of the deflationary
account of the typicality in time, which will become clearer in the next section. What
would be the “background invariant” for averaging over time? It is doubtful that such
concept is intelligible at all in the temporal case.
In other words, consider the standard expression for spatial average (e.g., Weinberg
2008):
A¯(~x, t)|I = 1
VI
∫
I
A(~x, t)
√
deth d3~x, (5)
where |I denotes averaging over a region VI of a spatial hypersurface I. Suppose, for
instance, that we try to define temporal average by analogy with (2) as:
〈A〉 = lim
t→tmax
1
t
∫ t
0
A(x)dx, (6)
tmax =
{
∞, open and flat Friedmann models
ttot, closed Friedmann models
(7)
The obvious problem is that the limiting process, t→ tmax is not necessarily legitimate
in either mathematical or physical sense. The functions under consideration need not be
regular, not to mention continuous in the temporal realm, even if they have intelligible
and well-defined meaning at all epochs. Even those which are expected to behave
reasonably well might be either sensitive on boundary conditions in an unpredictable
8way, or simply go quickly to zero, driving all averages to vanish asymptotically (in
the case of open-future cosmologies to which the post-1998 “new standard” cosmology
seemingly belongs).
Let us consider the following example of actual interest for astrophysics and
astrobiology which can serve as a toy model to highlight the problem. Consider the
question: how long will the current epoch of active star-formation in the universe
(dubbed the stelliferous era by Adams and Laughlin 1997) last? Clearly, the question
is of significant import for understanding of the evolution of stellar populations and
galaxies themselves. It is also of paramount importance for physical eschatology as the
“cosmology of the future” – but also for astrobiology as long as we accept that physical
conditions such as those encountered on Earth are necessary for the emergence of life
and intelligence.
Star formation histories of spiral galaxies are determined by the interplay between
incorporation of baryons into collapsed objects (stars, stellar remnants and smaller
objects, like planets, comets or dust grains) and return of baryons into diffuse state
(gaseous clouds and the intercloud medium). The latter process can be two-fold: (i)
mass return from stars to the interstellar medium (henceforth ISM) through stellar
winds, planetary nebulae, novae and supernovae, which happens at the local level; and
(ii) net global infall of baryons from outside of the disk (if any).
In a seminal study, Larson, Tinsley, and Caldwell (1980) considered the timescale for
gas exhaustion from spiral disks due to star formation (following the program outlined
in the early study of Roberts 1963), in an attempt to justify the bold hypothesis that
S0 galaxies may be disk galaxies that lost their gas-rich envelopes at an early stage and
consumed their remaining gas by quick star formation. They found that the appropriate
Roberts’ timescales for removal of ISM in spiral disks are in most cases rather short in
comparison to the Hubble time – a conclusion which in itself suggests a conflict with
temporal Copernicanism. In the roughest approximation, we can define the timescale
of gas consumption:
τgas =
∣∣∣∣ΣgasΣsfr
∣∣∣∣ , (8)
where Σgas is the gas surface density in units [Σgas]= M pc−2 and Σsfr the star formation
rate, Σsfr = dΣgas/dt = Σgas in units [Σsfr]= M Gyr−1pc−2 The empirical data in a
sample of 61 nearby spirals of Kennicutt (1998) are shown in Figure 1, clearly showing
preference for short (< 3 Gyr) timescales and the conclusion that we are living in a
special cosmological epoch, contrary to temporal Copernicanism.
The major development in the field of the global star formation was the realization
that there exists a star formation threshold at finite gas density or disk surface density
(Martin and Kennicutt 2001, and references therein). Empirical threshold gas surface
density seems about 6Mpc−2. Now, it obviously cannot be the whole story, since we
are aware of additional processes, notably recycling of gas and nonlinear dependence of
the star formation rate on gas density (Schmidt’s Law), not to mention possible massive
9Figure 1. The distribution of baseline gas consumption times based on the current
rate of star formation in the sample of Kennicutt (1998).
infall at late epochs. In general, one needs to integrate the equation
dΣgas
dt
= − [1− r(t)] Σsfr + I(t), (9)
where r(t) is the gas return fraction from stars to ISM, integrated over the entire
population of stars. For the classical Miller-Scalo initial mass function, this value today
is r(t0) = 0.42. I(t) is the gaseous infall rate; for the sake of simplicity, we can take the
Gaussian form (e.g., Prantzos and Silk 1998):
I(t) =
µ√
2piσ
exp
[
−(t− τinf)
2
2σ2
]
. (10)
Here µ is the normalizing mass scale for the infall, and σ and τinf are the infall temporal
width and the characteristic epoch both with dimensions of time. Prantzos and Silk use
fiducial values for these parameters as σ = τinf = 5 Gyr. These are constrained by the
present-day infall I0 ≡ I(t0) as:
µ = I0
√
2piσ exp
[
(t0 − τinf)2
2σ2
]
. (11)
For Schmidt’s Law we may use the usual ansatz Σsfr(t) = A[Σgas(t)]
n where A is the
conversion function independent of time (although it may vary with the galactocentric
radius, as indicated in several theoretical studies). For the index of Schmidt’s Law, we
use the value of n = 1.3± 0.2, which agrees with the Kennicutt (1998) study. All in all,
the impact of these complications is shown in Figure 2.
This is obviously a toy model, but it highlights some of the important features of
limits on the stelliferous era. The distribution of durations changes in shape with taking
10
Figure 2. Predictions for the gas exhaustion timescales (Roberts’ times) in a model
with Schmidt’s Law, Gaussian infall, and thresholds taken into account. In panel
a recycling is taken into account as well, while it is neglected in the panel b (the
difference is almost negligible). Hollow rectangles correspond to the fixed gas surface
density threshold of 6Mpc−2, and the shaded ones to the half that value.
additional physics into account, but does not show a substantial increase in the median
timescale. If anything, the median slightly decreases, since the star-formation thresholds
are very efficient in arresting active star formation, as is seen in well-studied individual
galaxies; in one of prototypical normal SA(s)c spirals, NGC 4254, it is easy to calculate
that even in the absence of thresholds gas density will fall below 1 Solar mass per pc2
in about 10 Gyr. Of course, one could try to play with different parameters like the
infall mass scale or the “true” index of Schmidt’s Law in order to select parts of the
parameter space corresponding to an increase in the duration of future star formation.
This, however, should not occlude the two main points of relevance for the present study:
(i) that part of the parameter space is small and requires fine tuning, thus returning
us to the very same difficulties temporal Copernicanism purports to resolve; and (ii)
the average star formation rate taken in the sense of Eq. (6) is zero. Therefore, our
observation that we are living in the epoch of active – though declining – star formation
in ISM of the Milky Way and other normal galaxies is, strictly speaking, in conflict with
the temporal Copernicanism.
One could go even further and note that there are stars – like M-dwarfs – which live
orders of magnitude longer than the Hubble time staying in an essentially unchanging
state on the Main Sequence for up to 1013 years (e.g., Laughlin, Bodenheimer, and
Adams 1997). Contemporary astrobiology reveals that they have planets and at least
potentially habitable Earth-like planets (Anglada-Escude´ et al. 2016; Astudillo-Defru
et al. 2017). Searches for biosignatures on planets around those extremely long-lived
M-dwarfs are currently under way. Note how much longer their lifetimes are than
even the most optimistic estimates of the future duration of the stelliferous era. This
means that there can be no “saving clause” for temporal Copernicans which would
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necessitate observers to be located in the stelliferous era (and hence in an atypical
cosmic time). Even in the absence of large-scale astroengineering feats of advanced
technological civilizations (which are perfectly in accordance with the laws of physics)
which could extend the lifetimes of observers and their communities still some orders of
magnitude more into the post-stelliferous eras of the universe, one expects observers to
arise and perhaps go extinct long after conventional star formation ceases.
3. Deflationary view and Copernicanism
In a more relaxed and general sense, the problem with averaging over large time spans
in nonlinear dynamical systems is not limited to cosmology. Similar situation might
occur in evolutionary biology, with respect to the contentious issue of the size of the
genome space sampled by evolution on Earth so far (Dryden, Thomson, and White 2008;
McLeish 2015). How to assess whether the current state of the terrestrial biosphere is
indeed typical with respect to the genomic diversity? Usually it is just assumed, but the
assumption is impossible to falsify, since it is unclear whether the question is actually
well-posed: how about future genomes created artificially by humans (or posthumans)
which could be designed, at least in principle, to be arbitrarily distant from the parent
population in the genome space? These will also be part of the terrestrial biosphere
on the most reasonable construals: however, accounting for their diversity is not only
impossible at present, but also will immensely bias the quantitative outcome. The
genome space is huge – resulting from combinatorics, essentially – and we can empirically
sample only a small part of that already minuscule part which was sampled in the course
of the 4.1 Gyr of the evolution of terrestrial life. This would correspond to the standard
view (or “received wisdom”) on this matter. Actually, whether evolution on Earth has
sampled a minuscule or a significant part of the viable genome space has been the subject
of some contention recently (e.g., Dryden, Thomson, and White 2008; McLeish 2015;
Powell and Mariscal 2015). And, just as in the cosmological examples, the absence of
meaningful averages makes any conclusion about typicality of the present-day biospheric
genome space untestable and hand-waving. It is entirely plausible that there are further
such examples.
Confronted with all these problems, it is only intellectually honest and rational to
admit the difficulties and adopt a more modest, deflationary account of typicality in
time: we cannot really say whether we are living in a typical cosmological epoch and we
should therefore refrain from assuming our typicality in this respect and deriving any
conclusion from such an assumption.
In brief, at our present level of knowledge there is no way to tell whether evolution of
sufficiently complex and sufficiently nonlinear world is sufficiently ergodic for whatever
mean values are required to be well-defined at all. And even if they were well-defined,
the practical task of computing them is far beyond our present capacities, requiring
predictive powers unlike anything we are dealing with in science. Therefore, in contrast
to some of the other ideas about typicality, the typicality of present epoch is extremely
12
difficult and possibly impossible to achieve even in principle, making the relevant
Copernican assumption more metaphysical and less scientific than any other typicality
assumption. Again, the assumption that the Sun is a typical star is rather easy to
theoretically specify and quantify, as well as empirically check now by observing a large
sample of stars, and it was in principle verifiable even in the time of Copernicus and
Galileo. In sharp contrast, the assumption that we are living in a typical cosmological
epoch is both theoretically confusing and empirically untestable; we are not sure how to
proceed, even in theory.
In fact, at a very basic level, there is a fundamental limitation in our ability to
predict the future evolution of the universe: if the cosmological constant (or a more
generic dark energy component) is non-zero (as in the currently favoured cosmological
model) than it is straightforward to show that no set of cosmological observations can
unambiguously determine the ultimate destiny of the universe (Krauss & Turner 1999).
This is often misinterpreted as a sort of technical difficulty; in fact, it is a limitation
so fundamental that it makes any kind of long-term integration such as in Eq. (6)
above meaningless. In such a position, the correct course is to accept that – until
further insights come in – we cannot truly argue that our temporal location is typical.
This would reject arguments such as Gott’s (who in fact tacitly admits it, strangely
enough, by failing to acknowledge the failure of PCP among listing the successes of
Copernicanism in the introductory part of his 1993 article) or Olsen’s.
As further example, consider the temporal distribution of habitable planets in the
Milky Way, as calculated by Lineweaver (2001) in the pioneering study of the topic, of
enormous importance for astrobiology and SETI studies (for subsequent more precise
elaborations, see Lineweaver, Fenner, and Gibson 2004; Behroozi and Peeples 2015;
Zackrisson et al. 2016). Lineweaver has established that the formation of Earth-like
planets started somewhat more than 9 Gyr ago and their median age is 6.4±0.9 Gyr. So,
we have obtained a temporal distribution of ages of a well-defined class of objects with
a definite fixed start, reaching maximum, then declining to the present-day value and
extending for an indefinite amount of time into the future. The study itself does not say
anything about the future distribution (since it deals with other issues of relevance for
astrobiology), but it is clear that the future extension does exist. More generally, recent
studies have started addressing the problem of the overall habitability of the universe in
time (e.g. Dayal et al. 2016, Loeb et al. 2016). This kind of investigation is still in its
infancy and its conclusions are very uncertain. However, there are no compelling reasons
to expect that the probability for the appearance of life in the universe is uniform in
time, and in fact there are quite more arguments to the contrary. This very fact clashes
with the presumption that we are observing a typical epoch of cosmic history.
The unwarranted assumption of uniformity for the temporal distribution of
intelligent observers in the universe has also strong consequences when assessing the
chances of success of SETI (or, more broadly, the search for signatures of technological
species, or “technosignatures”). In fact, most past studies in the field adopted, explicitly
or not, an underlying presumption of stationarity for the appearance of life over cosmic
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history: one notable example of this approach is the use of the Drake equation (Drake
1965) to estimate the number of communicating species present in the universe, in which
any time dependence of the relevant astrophysical or biological factors is neglected.
When evolutionary effects are properly taken into account, however, one can derive very
different estimates of the number of detectable technosignatures in the universe (C´irkovic´
2004, Balbi 2018). Similarly, relaxing the assumption of our temporal typicality can
render moot many discussions on the so-called Fermi paradox, i.e. the apparently
puzzling fact that we have not encountered any evidence of advanced civilizations in
the universe.
4. Discussion
The problem of temporal (un)typicality presents an excellent example of a problem
in astrophysics/physical cosmology with an important philosophical component. One
of the major methods of modern analytic philosophy, semantic analysis of terms such
as “average” or “universal”, obviously plays an important role in resolving – or even
getting better insight into – the issue. While spatial averaging brings no new unknowable
elements, and the uncertainty hinges on rather fine details like the back-reaction of
structure formation which is at least potentially observable, temporal averaging brings
radically new and at least in part unknowable elements, since the future is not similar
to the past.
An uncharitable mischaracterization of the present argument suggests that since
the future is uncertain, we could never hope to establish whether creatures like us
could exist in other epochs. Clearly, the deflationary view of typicality suggests much
more – even without the inherent ambiguity present in the word “uncertain”. As per
President Bush’s funny quote above, we can agree that the past is over – but we lack even
vague and provisional consensus about the future in most cases, so that the conclusion
about present being typical is as irrational as if somebody stopped watching a football
match at half-time on the pretext that the current score is typical enough. (And in the
cosmological case, it could be not 50%, but up to 10−80 of the total match!) In some
particular cosmological contexts, we could go much further along the deflationary path:
Hartle and Srednicki (2007) present a convincing case that one cannot falsify a theory
on account of it predicting that we are not typical. Together with what has been said
above, we may even argue that typicality, in general, provides very little inferential value
for a model – it may be a preferred prior, not a model selection tool. Even as a prior, it
is hardly a very robust one; its fragility depends on the specific problem situation, but
it needs to be taken into account in any specific discussion and not swept under the rug.
As a further example of how a typicality assumption can lead to conundrums and
to dubious model selection criteria, we can mention the flurry of recent cosmological
discussions about the so-called “Boltzmann brains” problem (Dyson et al. 2002): in
short, the argument is that if our universe lasts forever and reaches an asymptotical De
Sitter phase (as in the currently favoured cosmological constant scenario), one might
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expect random fluctuations away from thermodynamical equilibrium (i.e. from higher
to lower entropy) to give rise, in the future, to conscious observers that would vastly
outnumber those arising as a result of “ordinary” thermodynamic processes (i.e., from
lower to higher entropy). The argument goes on by using our own untypicality (as
long as we can be sure that we are not a Boltzmann brain) as a “proof” that there is
something wrong with the current cosmological model (or with extensions of it, such as
the eternal inflation scenario). Our untypicality with respect to hypothetic Boltzmann
brains has also been used to argue that the universe is likely to end in a finite time (Page,
2008). Note that, although the Boltzmann brain argument is not usually phrased as
stemming explicitly from a temporal typicality assumption, in fact it is strictly linked
to that, since it takes as puzzling the fact that we are observing the universe now, given
that most observers in the universe should be temporally located in the extremely far
future of a very long-lived universe. If one gives up a nave assumption of our temporal
typicality (or of typicality in general), however, the argument loses much of its strength.
The present view is related to the suggestion of Bene´treau-Dupin (2015) that
problems formulated in terms of Bayesian induction, like Gott’s (1993) version of the
traditional “doomsday argument” or various fine-tuning problems in cosmology, could be
resolved by an imprecise, “blurred out” approach. The deflationary view, when applied
to probabilistic problems, could be reformulated as implication that our ignorance
about future evolution implies a multiplicity of credence functions. This degeneracy
is a particular instance of the general failure of induction in the domain of the futures
studies/physical eschatology:
These cosmic puzzles show that, in the absence of an adequate
representation of ignorance or indifference, a logic of induction will inevitably
yield unwarranted results. Our usual methods of Bayesian induction are ill
equipped to allow us to address either puzzle. I have shown that the imprecise
credence framework allows us to treat both arguments in a way that avoids their
undesirable conclusions. The imprecise model rests on Bayesian methods, but
it is expressively richer than the usual Bayesian approach that only deals with
single probability distributions. (Bene´treau-Dupin 2015, pp. 889-90.)
Note that this does not apply solely to “cosmological puzzles” – even the future
of Earth or of any other complex system manifests a similar failure of simplistic
assumptions of temporal Copernicanism. (Although, in any restricted context, the
degree of approximation in assuming that the system is isolated becomes a source of
noise over and above the intrinsic uncertainties in the evolutionary dynamics.)
The deflationary view of the typicality in time suggested here needs not be worrying
for committed Copernicans: there are so many other parameters and instances in
which the Copernican principle is a trustworthy guide. If anything, anti-Copernican
attempts such as the controversial “rare Earth” hypothesis of Ward and Brownlee (2000)
erroneously predicted that there are very many “hot Jupiters” in the Milky Way, and
also that elliptical galaxies should not be considered habitable (see Dayal et al. 2015 for
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a persuasive argument to the contrary). On the other hand, the deflationary view does
impact those particular arguments which posit our temporal location as typical, such as
Olson’s argument discussed above or the doomsday argument of Gott.
We note that sensible applications of Copernicanism in time are in principle still
possible by focusing on subsets of the history of the universe where we might expect a
reasonably uniform behavior of some variable quantity relevant to the problem under
investigation. For example, when discussing the chances that life evolved on other
planets, one might restrict the time interval only to the ’stelliferous’ era, or some chunk
of it. But this is precisely the main caveat of our work: there is no straightforward way in
which our typicality in time can be assumed, without accompanying the assumption with
some knowledge of the temporal evolution of key factors involved in the habitability of
the universe and in the appearance of life. So, at the very least, our analysis highlights
the necessity of further work to understand the complicated variation in time of the
conditions that make the presence of observers possible.
There is another important difference between the legitimate applications of
Copernicanism, for instance, in spatial domain, and the illegitimate temporal
Copernicanism; this difference belongs to the domain of epistemology. We are in
principle free to travel through space, and spatial boundary conditions for our theoretical
models are subject to empirical verification (again, at least in principle and subject to
relativistic constrains). In the temporal domain we are blocked – barring closed timelike
curves or other forms of two-way time travel – from direct inspection of boundary
conditions. In the course of temporal evolution, coarse-graining erases accessible
information (not information sub specie aeternitatis, as even Stephen Hawking admitted
in 2004!). Obviously, this is the reason why some manifestly scientific questions cannot
be answered in practice and are often confused with metaphysical issues (e.g., why
the apparent sizes of the Sun and the Moon are so similar? why Venus has no large
moons? why life on Earth manifests homochirality? etc.). There is a chance, smaller
than usually assumed, that further work on rare and tenuous information reaching us
from the distant past will one day enable answering these such questions; this applies
to the future as well, however, since there is a small chance that one day we will reach
detailed and precise models of future evolution of various complex systems. In contrast
to implicit claims of temporal Copernicans, the macroscopic symmetry is restored to
epistemology – future temporal boundary conditions are at least as poorly understood
as the distant past temporal boundary conditions (see also Price 1996).
What can we do to improve our understanding of our temporal position?
Obviously, lacking empirical transtemporal perspective, what is required is to have
better theoretical insight into the long-term evolution of various physical systems. In
particular, the nascent discipline of physical eschatology is of paramount importance for
any averaging over cosmological time. There is a wealth of interesting results to be found
in studying the future of the universe, especially when massive numerical simulations
are applied to it, what has not been the case so far. To these studies, one should add
at least cursory examination of the impact of advanced technological civilizations on
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their physical surrounding, which gives rise to effects which are certainly non-negligible
in the cosmological future. Research programmes in this area offer promise of the
next significant multidisciplinary synthesis: the one of cosmology with astrobiology and
SETI studies. Like the previous grand synthesis of this kind – the one of cosmology and
particle physics which took place mainly in 1980s – this one is likely to bring fruit far
in excess of anything envisioned at the time of its conception.
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